Margaret Moore offers a comprehensive normative theory of territory.

Through an analysis of the moral relationship between people and place, this paper offers a new view of the wrongful character of gentrification, which is pluralistic, locating the wrong in the non-fulfillment of three place-related rights: rights to a home, rights of residency, and place-based rights to a community. By focusing on the multiple ways that people are connected to place, we offer a more complete and systematic account of place-related rights that is not only able to make sense of (...) people’s lived experiences of the harms of gentrification but is also able to address standard criticisms, which have been made of other key accounts of the wrong of gentrification. (shrink)

This essay argues that we have a duty to protect biodiversity hotspots, rooted in an argument about the wrongful imposition of risk and intergenerational justice. State authority over territory and resources is not unlimited; the state has a duty to protect these areas. The essay argues that although biodiversity loss is a global problem, it can be tackled at the domestic level through clear rules. The argument thus challenges the usual view of state sovereignty, which holds that authority over territory, (...) resources, and migration (all of which are connected to the protection of biodiversity hotspots) is unlimited. (shrink)

This chapter argues why we need a political theory of territory. We need it because the entire usable earth is divided into territorially distinct states, and the territorialization process is not complete yet, as states extend their control to the seabed, the oceans, and other uninhabited places. Yet we have no overarching theory of what justifies territory, how boundaries should be drawn or territorial disputes resolved. This lacuna extends to a range of disciplines, which have barely addressed territory itself. In (...) political philosophy, for example, there has been a focus on the relationship between state and citizen, but hardly any focus on territory. At the heart of this chapter, beyond motivating the book as a whole, is the claim that justifying authority over citizens is distinct from justifying authority over territory, and requires a separate argument. (shrink)

This chapter sets out the main elements of the self-determination theory of territory. It argues that a ‘people’ has rights to jurisdictional authority over the geographical area that it legitimately occupies if and only if: a large majority of people are in a relationship with one another which is characterized by a shared political commitment to establish rules and practices of self-determination; they have the political capacity to establish and sustain institutions of political self-determination; and they possess an objective history (...) of political cooperation together, for example through state or substate institutions or in a resistance movement. To put ‘people’ in the right relation to land it discusses three place-related rights: moral rights of residency, which attach to individuals; moral rights of occupancy, which attach to groups; and rights to territory, which attach to people through their political institutions. (shrink)

The Ethics of Nationalism blends philosophical discussion of the ethical merits and limits of nationalism with a detailed understanding of nationalist aspirations and a variety of national conflict zones. The author discusses the controversial and contemporary issues of rights of secession, the policies of the state in privileging a particular national group, the kinds of accommodations of minority national, and multi cultural identity groups that are justifiable and appropriate.

This chapter offers a conceptual analysis of territory, distinguishes it from property accounts, and discusses different versions of property accounts, all derived from Locke’s ‘Second Treatise of Government’. It offers a conceptual analysis of territory and the various rights associated with territory. According to Locke, territorial right is established through the subjection, by free consent, of persons and their land to state authority. This theory is found to rest on a number of flawed assumptions, among them claims to natural rights (...) of property and an obvious link between private property and territorial jurisdiction. Cara Nine draws on Lockean principles to claim that a state is a collective that, like individuals, owns property, namely the territory of the state. After examining the historical antecedents of such ideas, the chapter points away from them and towards accounts of territory based on individual and collective claims of rights. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article raises three concerns about Buchanan's argument related to the individualist description of ideology and psychological description of the obstacles to justice, as well as the way in which he separates empirical and normative beliefs, which, the article argues, are much more closely connected in all the examples that he raises. In the end, however, it agrees with Buchanan's central contention concerning the cognitive biases that interfere with progress towards justice, but, it argues, these operate at a more (...) sub‐conscious level than described by Buchanan. (shrink)

The paper analyses the interrelationship between Armstrong’s egalitarian theory and his treatment of the ‘attachment theory’ of resources, which is the dominant rival theory of resources that his theory is pitched against. On Armstrong’s theory, egalitarianism operates as a default position, from which special claims would need to be justified, but he also claims to be able to incorporate 'attachment' into his theory. The general question explored in the paper is the extent to which ‘attachment’ claims can be ‘married’ to (...) an egalitarian theory. The more specific argument is that a properly constrained attachment theory is more plausible than Armstrong’s egalitarian theory. It also criticizes attachment and improvement accounts as justifying permanent sovereignty over resources. The paper argues that neither of those arguments aim to justify the international doctrine of permanent sovereignty. (shrink)

This Article examines the two dominant theories of territorial justice — one associated with justice, the other with self–determination. It applies these theories to the case of Israel/palestine, and to ongoing claims by political actors with respect to territorial rights there. It argues that justice theory seems to straightforwardly suppose the territorial rights of the State of Israel, at least if historical and retrospective considerations are not at the forefront, though once they are brought in, this argument can be deployed (...) in support of a number of different political positions. The self–determination argument, it is argued, is somewhat less indeterminate and seems to most straightforwardly support a “two–state” compromise. However, as with justice theory, its assumptions can be challenged on a number of fronts, and could also be deployed to buttress other arguments. The merits and challenges of both theories are analyzed through this case study. (shrink)

This chapter examines arguments that link national community with a particular type of culture, and then links culture with something that is valued. Versions of this argument have been put forward by Tamir, Miller, Kymlicka, MacCormick, Margalit, and Raz. This chapter argues that it is important to distinguish between a culture and national identity.

This introductory chapter examines the debates concerning who are the people and the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self‐determination. It distinguishes between three types of arguments concerning conditions under which there might be a right to secede: choice theories, just‐cause theories, and national self‐determination theories.

This chapter examines the dominant conception of self‐determination in the decolonization period, and in much international law and practice, according to which self‐determination occurs within existing administrative units and there is civic integration within that territory. This chapter argues that this conception of self‐determination is only appropriate in a limited range of cases.

This chapter examines Will Kymlicka's argument in Liberalism, Community and Culture and Joseph Raz's argument in The Morality of Freedom, both of which justify liberal political principles in terms of a conception of the good life as embodying autonomy.

This chapter is concerned with moral arguments about membership in a national community, focusing on David Miller's On Nationality and Tom Hurka's article ‘The Justification of National Partiality’. It examines the bonds of attachment that co‐nationals feel towards those who share the same national identity, and the moral importance that should be placed on that.

This chapter considers whether collective self-determination, which justifies a right of jurisdiction, can also generate a right to control natural resources. It discusses the limits of that argument, focusing especially on the limits of justice. Part One deals with territorial claims over unoccupied islands, the seabed, the Arctic, and Antarctica. These are viewed as resources by the rival claimants, and their respective claims should be conceived of as property claims. The second part of the chapter deals with cases where there (...) are natural resources—oil, fertile land, water, coal—on land that is co-extensive with an area occupied by a group. It develops a middle ground between a strong resource rights conception, associated with current views of state sovereignty, and the cosmopolitan view that thinks of groups as having no special claims to resources within their midst, indeed thinking of it as a kind of undeserved advantage. (shrink)

This chapter considers the extent to which the self-determination argument, which justifies a people in exercising jurisdictional authority over territory, can be extended to justify those people in exercising control over the flow of persons and goods across borders. It considers whether preventing people from entering a state is a violation of their rights to free movement and rights to subsistence. Whatever the legitimacy of the right to control borders, it has to be understood as at best a qualified right, (...) since it has to be pursued in ways consistent with basic human rights. Richer political communities, it is argued, have obligations to ensure that basic entitlements of people to live a decent life are met, even if that does not amount to a direct argument for open borders. (shrink)

This chapter asks: under what circumstances can force be used to put right contested issues of territory? Not every territorial injustice justifies the use of force, but some do. It examines the standard case, which is the right of the state to defend itself, and particularly to defend its territory, then moves to more controversial situations involving either the defence or breach of territorial integrity. The book’s overall theory is considered in the light of what it says about: military force (...) used to regain territory or territorial rights; annexing territory that contains a majority of people who identify with the annexing state; force used by secessionists to break up an existing territorial state; force used by a majority against secessionists; and external intervention in contentious cases. (shrink)

(1996). A “reasonable” immigration policy. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 520-525.

The current statist order assumes that states have a right to make rules involving the transfer and/or extraction of natural resources within the territory. Cosmopolitan theories of global justice have questioned whether the state is justified in its control over natural resources, typically by pointing out that having resources is a matter of good luck, and this unfairness should be addressed. This paper argues that self-determination does generate a right over resources, which others should not interfere with. It does not (...) entail, however, that there is no obligation on rich countries to redistribute to poor countries. Indeed, in some rare instances, it might be necessary for a particular political community to use its resources, but the presumption is that the collectively self-determining group should have the right to decide that. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the taking of land should be theorized differently from other issues of corrective justice, not only because land is not moveable, and so cannot easily be distributed and redistributed and restored to the original occupant, but because morally significant relationships between people and place are likely to develop over time, and these affect the appropriate corrective justice remedy. Through analyzing these relationships, different types of wrongs involved in the taking of land can be identified, some of (...) which apply to individuals and some to groups. The argument is pursued through three different kinds of place-related wrongs: violating rights of residency, violating right of occupancy, and violating rights to territory. The different wrongs suggest different potential remedies and not all expulsions involve all three of them. (shrink)

This chapter considers the problems of adjudicating between rival claims to territory, drawing boundaries around jurisdictional units, and creating institutional arrangements that embody the principles developed thus far. It explores the implications of the collective moral right of occupancy in establishing heartlands of groups and argues that these heartlands are useful to demarcate boundaries between self-determining peoples and territories. It suggests that neither democratic theory nor justice theory can be usefully applied to the issue of drawing boundaries. After considering questions (...) of occupancy—its meaning, scope, and implications for territorial claims—the chapter concludes that the moral occupancy principle can identify ‘heartlands’ of groups but is indeterminate in certain cases. It also considers the implications of this argument for secessionist claims and for rival claims to the same territory, looking specifically at the historically contested areas of Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and Kurdish northern Iraq. (shrink)

This paper is interested in place-related attachments. It discusses the way in which territory or land is treated in theories of global distributive justice, and argues that this fails to capture the normatively significant relationship between peoples and places. This paper argues that any adequate theory of justice in territory has to begin by recognizing that territory is a claimant-relative good, and that this should be an important point of departure for theorizing about land and justice. Not only do the (...) current theories of distributive justice fail to acknowledge the claimant-relative nature of territory, but they do not offer a good way to incorporate place-related attachments in their theories. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the analysis of the previous chapters indicates the problems attached to conceiving of morality as rooted in a neutral or Archimedean point from which different principles can be assessed and validated, but that it is more fruitful to root morality within a particular tradition. The problem of moral scepticism and relativism and pluralism are discussed as well as the implications of this approach to moral theorizing for ethical political principles.

Contextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the derivation of liberal principles from a neutral starting point and claim that their liberal principles are justified because they are the most appropriate response to the circumstances that obtain in modern society, and particularly the circumstance of moral pluralism.

This chapter critically examines the two main versions of statist theories of territory, associated with the accounts given by Hobbes and Kant about the link between jurisdictional control over land and the fulfilment of the purpose of the state, which makes territorial right contingent on the achievement of those goods. The Hobbesian version identifies the achievement of peace, stability, coordination, and order as the function of the state and then justifies territorial rights as necessary to an effective state order. The (...) more moralized version, associated with Kant and contemporary Kantians, links the state with the achievement of justice, and argues that territorial rights should be accorded to a legitimate state. (shrink)

This chapter examines non-statist theories of territory, associated principally with the works of Avery Kolers and David Miller. Both attach rights to territory to non-statist collectives: to ethnogeographic communities, in Kolers’s work; and to cultural nations, in Miller’s work. Kolers defines an ethnogeographic group by its particular ecological and environmental relationship to land. Such a group has a specific ontology of land and a distinctive pattern of land use. Miller’s account is based on five elements that are said to constitute (...) a nation: shared belief, extension in history, active in character, territorially connected, and with a distinct public culture. This chapter criticizes the two theories, as part of an argument that the political self-determination theory is superior. (shrink)

This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.

In recent years numerous multi-national states have disintegrated along national lines, and today many more continue to witness bitter secessionist struggles. This ambitious study brings together for the first time a series of original essays on the ethics of secession. A host of leading figures explore key issues in this important debate, including, what is `a people' and what gives them a right to secede? And is national self-determination consistent with liberal and democratic principles or is it a dangerous doctrine?

The three major normative theories of secession are just-cause theories, choice theories, and national self-determination theories. Just-cause and choice theories are problematic because they view secession in terms of the application of liberal theories of justice or a liberal principle of autonomy, without regard for the dynamics of nationalist mobilitization and national politics. National self-determination theories can be supported by a collective autonomy argument. This is related to a particular view of the relationship between collective self-government and territory.

This paper focuses on land as a domain in which legitimate expectations can give rise to entitlements. The central argument is that people are connected to other people and to projects, which are symbolically and materially rooted in particular places. This gives rise to an interest – an interest that is sufficiently weighty that it imposes obligations on other people – to protect stability of place. There are two ways in which legitimate expectations structure argument about land. It justifies liberty (...) rights to remain in a place, and not be removed or expelled from it, independently of the coercion that often accompanies forcible expulsion, and argue for rights of return as a second-order right when this right has been violated. I also argue that passage of time in a changed context can affect people’s legitimate expectations, and so their entitlements. (shrink)

This book is an original critique of contemporary liberal theories of justice, focusing on the problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Margaret Moore's examination of prominent contemporary arguments for liberal justice reveals that individualist theories are subject to two serious difficulties: the motivation problem and the integrity problem. Individualists cannot explain why the individual should be motivated to act in accordance with the dictates of liberal (...) justice, andDSrelated to thisDSoffer radically incoherent accounts of the person. Revisionist liberal attempts to ground liberalism in contextual and perfectionist terms offer more defensible foundations, but Dr Moore argues that such theories do not support liberal political principles. She concludes by sketching a historical and concrete approach to political and ethical theorizing which reformulates the relation between self-interest and morality, and is not subject to the problems that beset liberal individualist theories of justice. Her book advances the debate between communitarians and liberals about the kind of moral foundation which a liberal society requires. (shrink)

These notes of G. E. Moore's lectures for the three terms of 1934-1935 were compiled by Alice Ambrose, then Student of Newnham College, and Margaret Macdonald, then Fellow of Girton College. The lectures cover a wealth of interrelated topics, and provide instances of the analyses which made Moore «the father of the analytic school.» Since his analyses of such concepts as material objects, sense data, and truth rest on the ordinary use of expressions for these concepts, «ordinary (...) language» philosophers found in him their champion. Moore examines the views of Broad, Russell, F. P. Ramsey, W. E. Johnson, and John Wisdom. (shrink)

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share (...) a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations. (shrink)

The nation is usually taken to be an expression, and ?nationalism? a defence, of culture. But we may have sanguinary national conflict (as in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia) where cultural difference is small; and we may have minimal conflict (as in Switzerland or Belgium) where cultural difference is great. This essay proposes a shift, away from seeing nations as grounded in culture, to seeing them as grounded in ?identity? ? often forged by historical forces having nothing to do (...) with culture per se. This essay rejects a cultural argument for liberal nationalism (associated with the work of Raz, Miller and Kymlicka among others) precisely because it confounds national identity with common culture. Since nations diverge despite a common culture, ?common culture? cannot explain them. Identity is more fundamental. It persists where culture changes. (shrink)

Les questions de justice soulevées par la possession du territoire sont nombreuses. Qui a droit à quoi ? La distribution est-elle équitable ? Quels sont les droits censés découler d’un droit au territoire ? Et il y en a bien d’autres. Le présent article met en évidence que ces questions de justice sont abordées sous une perspective plutôt différente selon la conception que l’on se fait du territoire. Il existe à ce dernier égard deux courants dominants : le premier, souvent (...) identifié à Locke, voit le territoire sous l’angle de la propriété ; le second, que l’on rattache à Kant, est considéré comme le domaine géographique du pouvoir juridictionnel.There are many justice issues raised by the possession of territory ; questions of who is entitled to what ; the fairness of the distribution ; and the entitlements that are thought to follow from having a right to territory, to name a few. This paper then goes on to show that these justice issues are framed somewhat differently depending on one’s conception of territory. There are two dominant conceptions of territory : territory as property ; and territory as the geographical domain of jurisdictional authority. The former is often identified with Locke, and the latter with Kant. (shrink)

This article outlines the two central theories in the ethics of secession and examines whether or under what conditions these normative theories would be satisfied in a post-invasion Iraq.

This article examines the nature of the wrongs that are inflicted on individuals and groups who have been expelled from the land that they previously occupied, and asks what they might consequently be owed as a matter of corrective justice. I argue that there are three sorts of potential wrongs involved in such expulsions: being deprived of the moral right of occupancy; being denied collective self-determination; and having one's property rights violated. Although analytically distinct, all of these wrongs are likely (...) to be perpetrated when people are expelled from their homelands. Although there is substantial literature on corrective justice dealing with such cases, most of that literature focuses on the expropriation of property only, and is therefore unlikely to grasp the full implications of the wrong done or to reveal the full extent of what might be owed to people as a matter of corrective justice. (shrink)

This article is interested in the general question of what justifies territorial rights over unoccupied places, including places that are not occupied but are situated within the territorial borders of a state. This question arises because one of the most common defenses of rights over territory makes use of the idea of occupancy and has difficulty explaining such rights in places that are not occupied. It explores this question through an examination of the claims and arguments in the Canadian Arctic, (...) which provides an historically specific test case for the merits and plausibility of the various arguments appealed to. It argues that territorial rights in unoccupied places, including the Canadian Arctic, are justified on different grounds than in occupied parts of the territory, and that the justification also affects the kinds of rights—particularly over resources—that such states can claim. (shrink)

This essay examines the central claim of Caney's book, viz., that there is no reason to treat the global sphere differently from the domestic sphere. It suggests that there is much that is valuable in having relatively autonomous, differentiated political communities, which both versions of Caney's scope argument ignore. This insight is explored via a critical assessment of both versions of Caney's scope argument; version 1, which is focused on civil and political rights (and argues that that they should be (...) universalized) and version 2, which applies to theories of distributive justice (particularly Caney's global equality of opportunity principle). (shrink)

This volume examines comparatively the views and principles of seven prominent ethical traditions on one of the most pressing issues of modern politics - the making and unmaking of state and national boundaries. The traditions represented are Judaism, Christianity, Islam, natural law, Confucianism, liberalism and international law. Each contributor, an expert within one of these traditions, shows how that tradition can handle the five dominant methods of altering state and national boundaries: conquest, settlement, purchase, inheritance and secession. Written by a (...) distinguished group of international specialists this volume is unique in providing both in-depth normative and comparative perspectives on a troubling question that will offer readers real insight into inter-tradition conflict. Those readers will range from upper-level undergraduates to scholars in such fields as philosophy, political science, international relations and comparative religion. (shrink)

It is critical to remember details about meetings with healthcare providers. Forgetting could result in inadequate knowledge about ones' health, non-adherence with treatments, and poorer health outcomes. Hearing the health care provider plays a crucial role in consolidating information for recall. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has meant a rapid transition to videoconference-based medicine, here described as telehealth. When using telehealth speech must be filtered and compressed, and research has shown that degraded speech is more challenging to remember. Here we present (...) preliminary results from a study that compared memory for health information provided in-person to telehealth. The data collection for this study was stopped due to the pandemic, but the preliminary results are interesting because the pandemic forced a rapid transition to telehealth. To examine a potential memory deficit for health information provided through telehealth, we presented older and younger adults with instructions on how to use two medical devices. One set of instructions was presented in-person, and the other through telehealth. Participants were asked to recall the instructions immediately after the session, and again after a 1-week delay. Overall, the number of details recalled was significantly lower when instructions were provided by telehealth, both immediately after the session and after a 1-week delay. It is likely that a mix of technological and communication strategies by the healthcare provider could reduce this telehealth memory deficit. Given the rapid transition to telehealth due to COVID-19, highlighting this deficit and providing potential solutions are timely and of utmost importance. (shrink)

Musical listening, looking at paintings and literary creation are activities that involve perceptual and cognitive activity and so are of interest to psychologists and other scientists of the mind. What sorts of interest should philosophers of the arts take in scientific approaches to such issues? Opinion currently ranges across a spectrum, with 'take no notice' at one end and 'abandon traditional philosophical methods' at the other. This collection of essays, originating in a Royal Institute of Philosophy conference at the Leeds (...) Art Gallery in 2012, represents many of the most interesting positions along that spectrum. Contributions address issues concerning aesthetic testimony, the processing and appreciation of poetry, the aesthetics of disgust, imagination, genre, evolutionary constraints on art appreciation, creativity, musical cognition and the limitations or productiveness of empirical enquiry for philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)